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ABSTRACT
This paper develops a market-based test of whether consumers make systematic mistakes in
assessing their own mortality risks, and whether they are able to make "correct" price comparisons
between insurance and credit markets. This test relies on data from secondary life insurance markets,
wherein consumers sell their life insurance policies to firms in return for an up front payment. We
find evidence consistent with the hypotheses that: (1) unhealthy consumers are systematically too
optimistic about their mortality risks and (2) consumers focus on nominal price information in
deciding to sell life insurance, rather than on the real discounted expected price.
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Making insurance and savings decisions is diﬃcult. Traditional economic
models of insurance decisions assume, at a minimum, that consumers can
solve two problems: (1) accurately assess the risks they face; and (2) inter-
pret the information conveyed by market prices. But are these assumptions
reasonable, especially in markets where consumers face unfamiliar risks?
In this paper, we develop a market-based test of whether consumers make
systematic mistakes in assessing their own mortality risks, and whether they
are able to make ”correct” price comparisons between insurance and credit
markets.1 Our test relies on new data from secondary life insurance markets,
wherein consumers bequeath their life insurance policies to ﬁrms in return
for an up-front payment. These markets are good candidates for such a test
because they require consumers to assess risks regarding their own mortal-
ity accurately, as well as decode complicated price signals in an unfamiliar
environment.
To set up this test, we develop an economic model of the consumer deci-
sion to sell life insurance in the secondary market in the context of compet-
itive pricing.2 This model of a sophisticated consumer produces two sharp
predictions. First, the model predicts a positive correlation between mortal-
ity risk and the decision to sell life insurance. The reasoning is that a sudden
increase in mortality risk increases the consumers’ wealth by increasing the
market value of the consumers’ life insurance policy. In response to this
increase in wealth, the consumers desire to increase both consumption and
bequests. Thus consumers sell some or all of their life insurance policy and
use some of the proceeds for current consumption and invest the remainder
for future consumption or bequests. Second, the model predicts a positive
correlation between asset holdings and the decision to sell life insurance.
Next, we contrast these predictions with the predictions from a model
with two mutually consistent interpretations motivated by the psychology
and behavioral economics literature: that unhealthy consumers are system-
atically too optimistic about their mortality risks and that consumers focus
on nominal price information in deciding to sell insurance, rather than on the
real discounted expected price. This model also predicts a positive correla-
tion between mortality and life insurance sales. However, in contrast to the
economic model this model predicts that (1) among healthier patients those
with signiﬁcant non-liquid assets should be less likely to sell life insurance
and that (2) among sicker patients those with signiﬁcant non-liquid assets
1should be more likely to sell life insurance. We test predictions from these
models against data on life insurance sales by HIV+ consumers.
2 Literature Review
There are extensive literatures on both consumer perception of mortality risk
and distortions in consumer decision-making under uncertainty. In this sec-
tion we brieﬂy summarize ﬁndings from both the psychology and the emerg-
ing behavioral economics literature that are most relevant to our research.
Barberis and Thaler [2002], Mullainathan and Thaler [2000], Kagel and Roth
[1995], Rabin [1998], and Kahneman and Tversky [2000] provide deeper and
more extensive reviews.
In the past, the behavioral economics literature has typically relied on
two types of non-market evidence: small-scale psychological experiments and
consumer self-reports of risk perceptions. Recently, market based tests of the
predictions of behavioral economics have emerged in two diﬀerent settings:
in ﬁnancial markets [see Barberis and Thaler, 2002] and in the analysis of
consumer savings behavior [see Bernheim et al., 1997].
2.1 Consumer perception of mortality risks
Extensive evidence from the psychology literature shows that people make
systematic mistakes in assessing their mortality risks. In particular, Lichten-
stein et al. [1978] and several other studies have shown that people underes-
timate mortality risks from likely causes of death and overestimate mortality
risks from unlikely causes of death. In related research, studies have found
that people overestimate highly publicized risks. For example, Moore and
Zhu [2000] hypothesize that given the recent ﬂood of information on the al-
leged hazards of passive smoking in government publications and the media,
people are likely to overestimate the health risk of passive smoking. They
ﬁnd evidence consistent with a model whereby individuals systematically
overestimate the eﬀects of passive smoking on their health and where the
short-term eﬀects of passive smoking on health care costs are negligible.
In addition to the evidence from psychology literature, recent studies
using data on subjective survival expectations from the Health Retirement
Study (HRS) and the Asset and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old
(AHEAD) ﬁnd that people tend to be optimistic about their longevity, with of
optimism greatest for people with the shortest life expectancies. Schoenbaum
2[1997], using data from the HRS, shows that current heavy smokers tend
to be overly optimistic about their probability of surviving to age 75; that
is, heavy smokers’ subjective assessment of their own survival probabilities
are higher than those obtained from actuarial models. By contrast, never
smokers’ subjective assessment of their probability of surviving to age 75 is
marginally lower than the actuarial prediction.
Hurd et al. [1999] report a very similar pattern among older populations
using data from the AHEAD. For example, 85-89 year-old female respon-
dents’ subjective probability of surviving to age 100 years is 0.30, while the
life table value is merely 0.07. By contrast, preumably healthier 70-74 year-
old female respondents are more pessimistic about their survival chances than
is warranted—their subjective probability of surviving to age 85 years is 0.51,
while the life table value is 0.58.
The data from these studies show that peoples’ perceptions of their own
mortality risks are systematically biased. In particular, people with relatively
low life expectancy tend to underestimate their mortality risks and people
with relatively high life expectancy tend to marginally overestimate their
mortality risks.
2.2 Limits to consumer problem solving ability
While much of the literature on consumer perceptions of mortality risks has
focused on consumer self-reports rather than market behavior, there is also
a growing body of evidence from markets which suggests that consumers
have limited information processing ability, and hence use simple heuristics
to economize on this scarce resource. Numerous studies have documented
how these simple heuristics sometimes lead consumers to make systematic
mistakes. For example, Odean [1998] ﬁnds that customers at a large broker-
age ﬁrm were less likely to realize capital losses than capital gains despite tax
incentives that encourage loss realization. Odean shows that this loss aver-
sion is consistent with prospect theory [Kahneman and Tversky, 1979] and
theories of mental accounting [Thaler, 1985]. Similarly, Benartzi and Thaler
[2001] ﬁnd that individuals making asset allocation decisions in deﬁned con-
tribution plans use a na¨ ıve “1/n strategy”: they divide contributions evenly
across the funds oﬀered in the plans. Consistent with this na¨ ıve notion of di-
versiﬁcation they ﬁnd that the proportion invested in stocks depends strongly
on the proportion of stock funds in the plan.
3Bernheim et al. [1997] analyze household data on wealth and savings,
arguing that the data are consistent with “rule of thumb” and “mental ac-
counting” theories of wealth accumulation. They ﬁnd little support for the
traditional life cycle model of savings and wealth accumulation. Laibson
[1997] also analyzes household savings behavior and argues that people not
only ﬁnd it diﬃcult to make optimal savings decisions but often ﬁnd it dif-
ﬁcult to stick their decisions. In particular, consumers’ short run discount
rates are much higher than their long run discount rates, implying that pref-
erences are time inconsistent. This discount structure leads consumers to
save little today even though savings are optimal from a life cycle perspec-
tive. Liabson argues that consumers often invest in illiquid assets or other
commitment devices to overcome this tendency for over-consumption.
Finally, many standard textbooks on life insurance markets claim that
price comparisons in life insurance are suﬃciently complex to be well beyond
the analytic capabilities of “ordinary” consumers [Maclean, 1962; Magee,
1958]. Research on life insurance markets reach similar conclusions. For
example, Belth [1966] argues that the inability of consumers to make price
comparisons in life insurance markets explains the persistence of substantial
variation in prices of similar life insurance products.
3 An Economic Model of the Decision to Sell Life In-
surance.
A secondary life insurance transaction (also called a viatical settlement) is
the sale of a life insurance policy to a third party for immediate cash payment
at a discount to face value; it involves the sale of a used life insurance policy.
When a consumer sells his used policy, the buyer becomes the sole beneﬁciary
of the policy and she collects the face value of the policy when he dies.3
There is a good reason why this market attracts only consumers who have
suﬀered adverse health events. Life insurance premiums are set at the time
of purchase based upon the mortality proﬁle of the consumer a tt h et i m eo f
purchase. When the consumer suﬀers an adverse health event (worse than
average for his age), suddenly he is more likely to collect his life insurance
earlier than originally thought at the time of purchase. Indeed, his premiums
would be much higher were he to buy the policy after the event. In eﬀect,
the adverse health event creates equity in the consumer’s used life insurance
policy. It is this equity, which is a real asset for the consumer, that is sold
4on the viatical settlements market.
With this reasoning in mind, we start our analysis of viatical settlement
markets by considering the plight of the chronically ill consumer who pur-
chased life insurance prior to the development of illness. Consumers con-
sidering whether to sell life insurance are often too frail to work—due to
life-threatening illness—and may need funds to ﬁnance consumption, includ-
ing medical treatment. Though their liquid assets may be insuﬃcient to
support their consumption, these consumers have the option to sell or bor-
row against their non-liquid assets, such as a house or life insurance, thereby
reducing bequests.
3.1 A Model of Consumption and Bequests under Mortal Uncer-
tainty
Consider a consumer whose initial wealth includes a house with a market
value of NL dollars (net of any outstanding loans against the house) and a
life insurance policy with face value ¯ F dollars. In our simple model, there
are two periods: consumers survive the ﬁrst period with certainty, die at the
beginning of the second period with probability π, and if they survive, die
with certainty at the end of the second period. Figure 1 is the timeline of
events in this two-period model.
At the beginning of the ﬁrst period the consumer earns income L1, sells
an amount F of his life insurance policy at the actuarially fair price, P (π),
consumes an amount C1 and borrows or lends his remaining liquid assets. At
the end of the ﬁrst period the uncertainty about the length of the consumer’s
life is resolved—he knows then whether he will survive to the second period.
If the consumer dies he leaves assets BD as bequests in the beginning of
period two, consisting of the net value of the consumer’s house, proceeds of
his remaining life insurance policy, and the portfolio of his bonds and interest
payments.
BD =( L1 + P (π) ∗ F − C1) ∗ (1 + r)+NL+ ¯ F − F (1)
The ﬁrst term in the parenthesis reﬂects the consumer’s net lending or bor-
rowing.
If the consumer survives, then at the beginning of the second period,
he earns income L2 and consumes an amount C2. Since all uncertainty is
resolved by the beginning of the second period, we assume that the consumer
bequeaths BS to his heirs and to the buyer of his life insurance policy at the
5beginning of the second period rather than when he dies at the end of the
second period. An heir who prefers to receive the bequest at the end of the
second period can simply buy a bond of one-year maturity with his bequests.
Under these conditions, second period bequests will include savings from the
ﬁrst period, life insurance that has not been cashed out, non-liquid assets,
and unspent earnings from the second period:
BS =( L1 + P (π) ∗ F − C1)∗(1 + r)+(NL+ ¯ F−F)∗
  1
1+r
 
+L2−C2 (2)
We assume that the market for used life insurance is competitive (see
footnote 2 for a justiﬁcation of this assumption). Thus, P (π) is the perfectly
competitive market price a viatical settlement company is willing to pay per
unit face value of a policyholder with mortality risk π.L e tr be the market
rate of interest at which the ﬁrms can borrow funds. Assuming that the
consumer continues to pay the premium on the policy even after the sale of
the policy, the present value of the expected proﬁt from the purchase of the
policy is:
proﬁts =
  
π
1+r
+
1 − π
(1 + r)
2
 
− P (π)
 
F (3)
The ﬁrst terms in equation (3) represents the present value of the expected
revenue the buyer would receive after the death of the policyholder, while the
last term represents the cost to the ﬁrm of purchasing the policy. Therefore
the zero-proﬁt condition under perfect competition implies:
P(π)=
 
π
1+r
+
1 − π
(1 + r)
2
 
(4)
The above condition can be viewed as the demand for life insurance given
the mortality risk of the consumer and the cost of funds for the ﬁrm. In equi-
librium, the prices are actuarially fair and the ﬁrms are willing to buy all
life insurance policies supplied by consumers. The consumer’s problem is to
choose the optimal value of consumption and the ﬁnancing of the consump-
tion through sale of life insurance or credit to maximize expected utility from
consumption and bequests.
EU = U (C1)+πβV (BD)+( 1− π)βU(C2)+( 1− π)βV (BS)( 5 )
6Substituting equations (1), (2), and (4) for BD, BS,a n dP(π) respectively,
and then diﬀerentiating (5) with respect to C1,C 2,F yields the following ﬁrst
order conditions.
U (C1)
[(π)V  (BD)+( 1− π)V  (BS)]
= β (1 + r)( 6 )
U
 (C2)=V
 (BS)( 7 )
V
 (BD)=V
 (BS)( 8 )
Equation (6) shows that consumers choose consumption in the ﬁrst pe-
riod so that the ratio of the marginal utility of consumption to the expected
marginal utility of bequests equals the ratio of the consumer’s intertemporal
discount factor to the market discount factor. Similarly, equation (7) shows
that once the uncertainty about death is resolved, consumers choose con-
sumption so that the marginal utility of consumption in the second period
equals the marginal utility of bequests in the second period.
Equation (8) shows that selling life insurance helps consumer reduce the
“riskiness” of their bequest portfolio. As in other insurance markets, risk
averse consumers sell life insurance to equalize the marginal utility of be-
quests whether the consumer dies at the end of the ﬁrst period or survives to
the second period. Borrowing does not aﬀect the “riskiness” of the bequest
portfolio since the repayment of loans taken in prior periods is not contingent
on the mortality of the consumer. On the other hand, selling life insurance
enables consumers to increase resources when alive at the cost of reducing
near term bequests. In other words, the ex post cost of obtaining funds from
a viatical settlement (relative to borrowing) will depend on the timing of the
consumer’s death—if consumers die at the end of the second period then a
viatical settlement will have lower costs than borrowing but if consumers die
at the end of the ﬁrst period then viatical settlement will be more expensive
than borrowing. Of course, the expected ex ante cost of ﬁnancing an extra
dollar of consumption through borrowing and selling life insurance will be
the same.
3.2 The Eﬀect of Mortality Risk on the Size of the Settlement
Appendix A solves the consumer’s maximization problem and derives the
key comparative statics. The results show that an increase in mortality risk
7increases the magnitude of life insurance sales.
dF
dπ
> 0( 9 )
The intuition for this result is as follows. An increase in mortality risk
increases the consumer’s wealth by increasing equity in the consumer’s life
insurance policy. In response to this increase in wealth, the consumer will
demand both increased consumption and bequests, which are both assumed
to be normal goods. Thus the consumer will sell some or all of the life
insurance policy and use some of the proceeds for current consumption and
invest remaining proceeds for future consumption or bequests.
3.3 The Eﬀect of Assets on the Size of the Settlement
The comparative static results show that an increase in the value of the
consumer’s house, or an increase in current income, raises the magnitude of
life insurance sales.
dF
dNL
> 0 (10)
dF
dL1
> 0 (11)
The intuition for these results is as follows. Trivially, an increase in the
value of the consumer’s house or an increase in the current income increases
the consumer’s wealth. This increase in wealth would mechanically increase
the size of near-term bequests, BD, were the consumer to die at the end
of the ﬁrst period. To maximize utility under these changed circumstances
and equate the marginal utility of bequests and consumption, the consumer
will want to liquidate some of his life insurance holdings, eﬀectively moving
funds between from the early death state of the world (which is overly funded
because of the nature of the increased wealth) to the current time period.
Therefore, the consumer will increase life insurance sales and use some of his
wealth to increase consumption and late term bequests, at the expense of
the originally increased near term bequests.
In contrast, if the consumer experiences an increase in future income then
in equilibrium, he would reduce the magnitude of life insurance sales.
8dF
dL2
< 0 (12)
The intuition for this result is that an increase in future income increases
future bequests but leaves near term bequests unchanged. Consumers reduce
life insurance sales and increase borrowing to simultaneously increase current
consumption and bequests and reduce late-term bequests, again equilibrating
marginal utility across the states of the world and across time periods in
accordance with the ﬁrst order conditions (6)-(8).
4 A Model of Misperceived Price and the Decision to
Sell Insurance
This section presents an alternative model of the decision to sell life insurance
in which consumers have misperceptions about the real price (opportunity
cost) of selling insurance. The key assumption in this model is that relatively
unhealthy consumers perceive a higher return from selling life insurance rel-
ative to borrowing than actually exists, and that the opposite is true for
relatively healthy consumers. This assumption can be motivated in at least
two ways, both consistent with the spirit of the papers cited in our literature
review.
The ﬁrst motivation is that relatively unhealthy consumers overestimate
their life expectancy while relatively healthy consumers slightly underesti-
mate their life expectancy. This “optimism bias” of relatively unhealthy
consumers leads them to view actuarially fair viatical settlement oﬀers more
favorably than they would appear to someone correctly perceiving mortality
risk.
The second motivation is that consumers with limited analytic capabil-
ities use a simple rule of thumb to calculate the present value of expected
costs (in terms of forgone bequests) of a viatical settlement. In particular,
consumers incorrectly mistake the discount to face value (nominal price) on
the viatical settlement for the true cost of a viatical settlement—which is
the net present value of foregone bequests. Since in competitive markets the
discount to face value rises with life expectancy this view also leads con-
sumers to view actuarially fair viatical settlement oﬀers more favorably if
they expect to live a long life. For example, if viatical settlement ﬁrms face a
cost of borrowing of 15% per annum, then under a constant mortality hazard
9assumption the actuarially fair price of a life insurance policy held by a con-
sumer with life expectancy of 6 months is 95% (or 5% discount on face value)
of the face value and for a consumer with a life expectancy of 2 years is 79%
(or 21% discount on face value). We argue that consumers ﬁxate on the dis-
count to face value rather than the true cost (15% per annum) of the viatical
settlement. Thus, consumers with life expectancy of 6 months prefer selling
life insurance to borrowing at an interest rate of 15% per annum, and the
opposite holds for consumers with life expectancy of 2 years. Even though
prices are actuarially fair, unhealthy consumers prefer selling life insurance
and healthy consumers prefer borrowing.
As in the economic model of the previous section, consumers hold three
distinct assets: a life insurance policy, other non-liquid assets such as housing,
and liquid assets such as income. They can ﬁnance consumption in three
ways. They can consume liquid assets directly, borrow against other non-
liquid assets at a given interest rate r,o rs e l lp a r to ra l lo ft h e i rl i f ei n s u r a n c e
policy at a price p per dollar of coverage. Each action has costs in terms
of foregone bequests. Liquid assets cannot be bequeathed once spent, loans
must be repaid, and heirs cannot collect on life insurance that has been sold.
Unlike in the economic model, consumers in this model solve a static opti-
mization problem of distributing wealth between consumption and bequests
to maximize utility.4 In particular, such consumers do not discount bequests,
while ﬁrms, which live forever and are risk neutral, discount future income
at the market rate of interest. This simple model generates sharp predictions
that we can test with the available data; adding some dynamic elements to
the model would complicate it without altering the main predictions that we
test in the empirical portion of the paper.
4.1 The Eﬀect of Mortality Risk on the Size of the Settlement
As our example in the introduction to this section shows, the discount to
face value of life insurance oﬀered by viatical settlement ﬁrms depends on life
expectancy. Even for life insurance policies with the same face value, ﬁrms
will charge lower discounts to consumers closer the end of life since ﬁrms
are more likely to collect earlier. Since consumers in this section incorrectly
perceive the discount to face value as the true price of the viatical settlement,
they trade oﬀ the discount to face value against the annual interest rate for
borrowing. Assuming that the market interest rate for borrowing is the same
for everyone, relatively unhealthy consumers will perceive terms of trade to
10be more lucrative in the viatical settlements market than in the credit market.
More formally, let ai reﬂect consumer i’s risk of death, and let H1 =
{i|ai < ¯ a}, H2 = {i|ai =¯ a},a n dH3 = {i|ai > ¯ a} for some cutoﬀ level ¯ a so
that H1 consists of healthier consumers than H3.W ec h o o s eac u t o ﬀv a l u e
¯ a such that for consumers in H2, the perceived costs of ﬁnancing current
consumption through the credit and viatical settlement markets are equal.
H1 consumers perceive lower prices in the credit market, while H3 consumers
perceive the viatical settlements market to be more lucrative. Figure 2 shows
the budget constraint for H3 consumers. The vertical axis represents current
consumption, the horizontal axis represents bequests, and W represents the
initial endowment,
 
L,NL + ¯ F
 
. B represents the net present value of the
endowment—L + p ¯ F + NL
1+r,w h e r ep is the actuarially fair unit price of life
insurance sales.
Selling all of ¯ F moves consumers from W to A, where consumers have only
non-liquid assets left to fund bequests. To increase current consumption past
A, consumers must turn to the credit market, where they borrow at interest
rate r, represented by the line segment AB. At point B, consumers leave
no bequests, consuming everything in the current period. The kink in the
budget constraint is caused by consumer’s misperception about the relative
prices of borrowing and selling life insurance. A consumer who correctly
observed that the real prices of the two activities are the same would have
a straight line connecting points W and B for a budget constraint since the
policy is discounted by ﬁrms at the market rate of interest, the same rate at
which consumers can borrow.
Another strategy that consumers could pursue would be to borrow ﬁrst
and then sell their life insurance after their credit is exhausted. WCB is
the perceived budget constraint for this strategy, where C represents the
exhaustion of non-liquid asset collateral and B represents the sale of ¯ F as well.
Since H3 (the unhealthiest) consumers perceive that the terms of trade favor
the viatical settlements market; the slope of WA is greater (in absolute value)
than the slope of WC. Therefore, consumers will viaticate ﬁrst and then
borrow only if p ¯ F is insuﬃcient to ﬁnance current consumption. Similarly
H1 (the healthiest) consumers will perceive that the terms of trade favor
credit markets and choose to borrow ﬁrst. Therefore this model also predicts
a negative correlation between health status and the decision to viaticate.
114.2 Eﬀect of Assets on the Size of the Settlement
Changes in non-liquid assets lead to a parallel shift in the consumer’s bud-
get line and do not aﬀect the perceived terms of trade in the two markets.
Increasing non-liquid assets raises both the value of the endowment and max-
imum possible bequests, since consumers either leave additional non-liquid
assets as bequests or use them for borrowing.
For healthy H1 consumers, these additional assets will induce them to
substitute borrowing for life insurance sales, since the former is on more fa-
vorable terms. Figure 3 shows this eﬀect. H1 consumers initially borrow fully
against their non-liquid assets and also sell life insurance at E. For the utility
curves as drawn, increasing NL shifts the budget line from WAB to W’A’B’.
At E’, consumers have completely substituted borrowing for viaticating.5 For
other preferences, this complete substitution may not happen, but as long as
consumption and bequests are normal goods, increased assets will decrease
life insurance sales for H1 consumers.
For sicker H3 consumers, the additional non-liquid assets can induce more
life insurance sales. Figure 4 demonstrates the eﬀect of an increase in NL
for H3 consumers. For these consumers, terms of trade favor the viatical
settlements market. If consumption is a normal good, an increase in NL
leads these consumers to sell a larger part of ¯ F, as they can use the additional
non-liquid assets to ﬁnance bequests. At G’ on the new budget constraint,
consumers sell the same amount of life insurance as at their initial optimum,
E. Thus, the new equilibrium will lie on C’G’, where consumers sell a larger
part of ¯ F than at E.
Increasing liquid assets leads to a parallel shift in the consumer’s budget
constraint. Consumers use additional liquid assets to either ﬁnance increased
consumption or to increase bequests by substituting for viatication or bor-
rowing. If bequests are a normal good, increasing liquid assets will cause
consumers to decrease their supply of life insurance, decrease their borrow-
ing, or both. For H1 consumers who do not initially sell life insurance,
increasing liquid assets will reduce borrowing but have no eﬀect on life in-
surance supply. For H3 consumers who sell all of their life insurance and also
borrow, the eﬀects of increasing L depend upon the strength of the income
eﬀect. If the income eﬀect is strong, consumers eliminate borrowing and re-
duce their supply of life insurance. If the income eﬀect is weak, consumers
continue to sell all of ¯ F, but reduce borrowing. Hence, for H3 consumers as
well, increasing liquid assets will never increase the supply of life insurance.
125 Comparing Predictions from the Economic and Mis-
perceived Price Model
Both the economic model and the misperceived price model make several
sharp predictions regarding the behavior of consumers in the viatical settle-
ment and credit markets.
Prediction 1: Health status is negatively correlated with the decision to
viaticate.
Although this prediction is consistent with both the economic model and
the misperceived price model the mechanism through which mortality risks
aﬀect life insurance sales is very diﬀerent across the two models. In the
economic model an increase in mortality risk increases the value of the con-
sumers’ life insurance policy. This “wealth-eﬀect” induces consumers to in-
crease life insurance sales to ﬁnance increased consumption at the cost of
reduced bequests. In contrast, in the misperceived price model the negative
correlation between health status and the decision to viaticate arises from
a “price-eﬀect.” Unhealthy consumers perceive that the terms of trade are
more favorable in the viatical settlements market as the discount to face value
of their life insurance increases with life expectancy.
Prediction 2[E]: For all consumers, the decision to viaticate is positively
correlated with non-liquid assets.
This prediction is consistent with the economic model only and follows di-
rectly from the comparative static result shown in equation (10). In contrast,
the misperceived price model makes the following prediction:
Prediction 2[M]: For the healthiest consumers, the decision to viaticate is
negatively correlated with non-liquid assets. For the sickest, the decision to
viaticate is positively correlated with non-liquid assets.
This follows from Figures 4 and 3 and is a rather stringent test of the
misperceived price model. It requires that the impact of non-liquid assets
on the decision to viaticate in our empirical speciﬁcation have diﬀerent signs
depending on the underlying health status of the consumer.
Prediction 3[E]: For all consumers, increase in liquid assets or current
13income will increase the incentive to participate in the viatical settlements
market.
This prediction is consistent with the economic model only. Thus, it
would constitute evidence in favor of the economic model if we observe that
people with higher incomes are more likely to viaticate than are patients with
lower incomes. In contrast, the misperceived price model makes the following
predictions.
Prediction 3[M]: For all consumers, increase in liquid assets will either re-
duce or leave unchanged the incentive to participate in the viatical settlements
market.
Thus, a measured zero or negative correlation between the decision to
viaticate (or borrowing) and amount of liquid assets, all else remaining the
same, would be consistent with the predictions of the misperceived price
model.
6 Empirical Tests of the Models
To test the predictions of these models, we use data from the HIV Costs
and Services Utilization Study (HCSUS), a nationally representative survey
of HIV-infected adults receiving care in the United States. This dataset is
appropriate because it contains extensive information on a sample of ter-
minally ill patients who constitute a large share of the viatical settlements
market [National Viatical Association, 1999]. Bozzette et al. [1998] describe
the design of the data set, including sampling, in detail. Though HCSUS
does not contain information about transaction prices and quantities in the
viatical settlements market, we do not need them to conduct the tests we
describe in Section 5.
6.1 Data
HCSUS is a panel study that followed a cohort of HIV+ patients over three
interview waves. The dataset has information on the respondents’ demo-
graphics, income and assets, health status, life insurance, and participation
in the viatical settlements market.
14Questions about life insurance holdings and sales were asked in the ﬁrst
follow-up (FU1) survey in 1997 and the second follow-up (FU2) survey in
1998. Of the 2,466 respondents in FU1, 1,353 (54.7%) reported life insurance
holdings. These 1,353 respondents are our analytic sample as they are the
only patients at risk to viaticate. We exclude 344 respondents with missing
values for at least one of the key variables—diagnosis date, health status,
liquid assets, or non-liquid assets. These exclude respondents were similar to
the sample with complete data when compared by their observed covariates.
We also exclude 123 respondents who resided in states with minimum price
regulation of viatical settlements as these regulations distort the viatical
settlements market by restricting settlements by relatively healthy consumers
[see Bhattacharya et al., 2002]. In our remaining analytic sample of 886
respondents, 146 (16%) respondents had sold their life insurance by the FU1
or FU2 interview dates.
Table 1 compares summary statistics from the baseline interview of re-
spondents who sold their life insurance at some point in time with those who
never did.6 Viators are more likely than never-viators to be male, white,
college-educated and older. They are also richer and are more likely to own
a house. They are also less likely to be married or have any children alive.
Finally, viators are typically in poorer health than never-viators, with lower
CD4 T-cell levels at the baseline survey and more progressive HIV disease.
6.2 The Hazard of Viaticating
HCSUS respondents report whether they sold their life insurance by the ﬁrst
or second follow-up interview. Given these responses, we estimate an empiri-
cal model of the decision to viaticate that allows for time-varying covariates.
Because we do not observe quantity sold, our focus is necessarily on the
decision to sell at all.
There are three kinds of respondents—those who have viaticated by FU1,
those who viaticated between FU1 and FU2, and those who never viaticate in
the observation window. Each has a diﬀerent contribution to the likelihood
function. Let λ(t) be the probability of viaticating at time t given that the
respondent has not viaticated in the preceding t−1 years. Time is measured
starting from the year of diagnosis with HIV, or the viatical settlements
market inception date—1988—whichever is earlier. The probability that a
respondent never viaticated is
T  
t=1
(1 − λ(t)), where T is years between the
15start and end of the observation window. Similarly, the probability that a
respondent viaticated by FU1 is 1−
T1  
t=1
(1 − λ(t)), where T1 is years between
the start and the FU1 interview date. The probability that a respondent did
not viaticate between the start date and FU1 but did viaticate by FU2 is
T1  
t=1
(1 − λ(t)) −
T2  
t=1
(1 − λ(t)), where T2 is years between the start and the
FU2 interview date. Combining these three types of respondents gives the
likelihood function:
L =
N  
i=1
D1i
 
T1  
t=1
(1 − λi (t)) −
T2  
t=1
(1 − λi (t))
 
+ (13)
D2i
 
1 −
T1  
t=1
(1 − λi (t))
 
+
D3i
 
T  
t=1
(1 − λi (t))
 
where, i subscripts over the N respondents; D1i is a binary variable that
indicates if respondent i viaticated between FU1 and FU2; D2i indicates if
respondent i viaticated by FU1; and D3i indicates that respondent i never
viaticated.
We model the hazard of viaticating as,
λi (t)=
1
1+e x p ( λ0
t + Xitβ)
, (14)
where, Xit is a vector of covariates measured at time t,β is the vector of
regression coeﬃcients, and 1
1+exp(λ0
t) is the baseline logit hazard rate. We
maximize the likelihood function (13) with respect to the parameters λ0
tand
β.
HCSUS respondents were interviewed at three discrete times. One major
consequence of this sampling strategy is that we do not observe Xit at each
point in time t, so we have no measures of patient health status or changes
in assets between surveys. We use a step function approximation to impute
values of Xit. For example, suppose a respondent is sampled at time points
t1, t2,a n dt3, and reports values for Xt of x1, x2,a n dx3 at each of these
time points respectively. We assign
16Xt =

 
 
x1 for t ≤ t1
x2 for t1 <t≤ t2
x3 for t2 <t≤ t3
6.3 Measuring Health, Income, and Assets
We include demographics, health status, income, and a full set of interac-
tions between non-liquid assets and health status as covariates in our sur-
vival analysis. We also include marital status, living alone, and whether
the respondent has at least one living child as proxies for the strength of
the bequest motive. When HCSUS was conducted, the two most impor-
tant health status measures for HIV patients were CD4+ T-lymphocyte cell
count and the Center for Disease Control (CDC) deﬁnition of clinical stage.
CD4+ T-cell count measures the function of a patient’s immune system; de-
pletion correlates strongly with worsening HIV disease and increasing risk
of opportunistic infections [Fauci et al., 1998]. While healthy patients have
CD4 cell counts above 500 cells per ml., declines into lower clinically recog-
nized ranges correlate with worsening disease. These ranges are: between
200 and 500 cells per ml., between 50 and 200 cells per ml., and below 50
cells per ml. There are three categories in the CDC deﬁnition of clinical
stage: asymptomatic, symptomatic, and AIDS [Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention, 1993]. Patients have AIDS if they manifest conditions such
as Kaposi’s Sarcoma, Toxoplasmosis, or the other life-threatening conditions
on the CDC list. Symptomatic HIV+ patients manifest signs of to their
infection, but not one of the CDC’s listed conditions.
Ideally, we would like to classify HCSUS respondents into groups H1 and
H3 that are based upon their subjective mortality risks, but these data are not
available. Instead, we construct a one-dimensional indicator of mortality risk
by regressing one-year mortality after the baseline survey on the two clinical
health measures. This probit regression is shown in Table 2. Not surprisingly,
respondents with lower CD4 T-cell levels or with more advanced disease
are more likely to die. Using these results, we predict one-year mortality
rates for each respondent at each time point when we have new CD4 T-cell
levels and clinical stage indicators. Finally, we use a cutoﬀ value of 0.04 for
predicted mortality to divide our sample into respondents with high mortality
risks (25% of respondents at baseline) and respondents with low mortality
risk (75% of respondents at baseline). Based upon this division we create
17two linearly dependent dummy variables, Unhealthy and Healthy,w h i c ha r e
our main health status indicators. Because we do not know the true cutoﬀ
value we try diﬀerent cut-oﬀ values for the health status indicator in other
speciﬁcations to test the robustness of our results.
We use house ownership as the measure of non-liquid assets as it was asked
in all three surveys. Respondents who owned a house at baseline reported
having higher non-liquid assets as compared to respondents who did not own
a house at baseline ($66,740 vs. $25,832).7 We designate the indicators for
house ownership and non-ownership as House and NoHouse, respectively. We
use income, which was asked in each interview, as a measure of liquid assets.
Because many HCSUS respondents only report their income within ranges,
we enter income in our models as a series of indicator variables: 1(Income<
$500permonth), 1($501 ≤ Income<$2,000), and 1(Income≥ $2,000).
6.4 Summary of Hypothesis
Table 3 maps the predictions from the economic and misperceived price mod-
els into testable hypotheses. To evaluate them, we include in the model in-
teractions between health status (Unhealthy) and house ownership (House).
The ﬁrst prediction implies that the hazard of viaticating should be higher
for the unhealthy, regardless of home ownership.
Prediction 2[M] implies that home ownership should have an opposite
eﬀect on the healthy than it has on the unhealthy. For the unhealthy, home
ownership should increase the probability of viaticating; for the healthy, it
should reduce it. We consider this a strong test of the misperceived price
model, since the eﬀect of assets should reverse sign based on the classiﬁcation
of health from the one-year mortality regression. In contrast, Prediction
2[E] implies that the hazard of viaticating should be higher for homeowners,
regardless of health status.
Prediction 3[M] implies that high income consumers with will be less
likely to viaticate to ﬁnance consumption, while Prediction 3[E] implies that
high income consumers will be more likely to viaticate.
6.5 Results
Table 4 reports the average hazard ratios at t = 1 and baseline hazard rates
for four diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the empirical model. We average the hazard
ratios for each covariate across all individuals in the sample as they depend
18not only on the regression coeﬃcient associated with the covariate but also
on the values of the other covariates. Appendix B speciﬁes our methodology
for computing the hazard ratios and their conﬁdence intervals.
The second column (Model 1) in Table 4 reports the results for the sim-
plest empirical model needed to test the hypotheses presented in Table 3.
Healthy consumers with houses have the lowest viatication hazards. Healthy
consumers without houses are 1.6 times more likely to viaticate at t =1
year than healthy house owners, unhealthy consumers without houses are
2.2 times more likely, while unhealthy consumers who own a house are 3.9
times more likely. Figure 5 plots the predicted survivor functions—that is,
cumulative probability of not viaticating—implied by the results in Model 1
for each house ownership and health group from t =1y e a rt ot =9Y e a r s8
It clearly demonstrates an ordering of viatication hazards that are consistent
with the misperceived price model. In particular, among healthy consumers
homeowners are signiﬁcantly less likely to viaticate. In contrast, among
unhealthy consumers homeowners are signiﬁcantly more likely to viaticate.
These results are consistent with prediction 2[M] of the misperceived price
model,rather than prediction 2[E] of the economic model. The results are
also consistent with prediction 1 from both the economic and misperceived
price model. Regardless of home ownership, unhealthy consumers are signif-
icantly more likely to viaticate. Income has no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect
on viatication probabilities, which is also weak evidence favoring Prediction
3[M] of the misperceived price model.
Model 2 in Table 4 adds demographic, bequest motive, and education
variables to Model 1. Whites have signiﬁcantly higher hazards of viaticating
than do Blacks, Hispanics, and respondents of other races. Older respon-
dents are signiﬁcantly more likely to viaticate. Respondents with no children
alive are more likely to viaticate, though the eﬀect is statistically signiﬁcant
at the 90% conﬁdence level. There are no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences
between high school dropouts, high school graduates and college educated re-
spondents in viatication hazards, though the point estimates indicate college
graduates and those with some college education are more likely to viaticate.
As was the case with Model 1, the results of these models are also con-
sistent with misperceived price model. In particular, we ﬁnd that among
healthy consumers those with houses are signiﬁcantly less likely to viaticate
than those without, which is consistent with prediction 2[M] of the misper-
ceived price model, but inconsistent with prediction 2[E] of the economic
model.
19In Models 3 and 4, we check the robustness of our results to a change in
the deﬁnition of health status. Instead of a cutoﬀ value of 0.04 for predicted
mortality, we use a value of 0.012 to divide our sample diﬀerently into un-
healthy (50% of respondents at baseline) and healthy respondents (50% of
respondents at baseline). Except for the change in deﬁnition of health sta-
tus, the speciﬁcation of Models 3 and 4 are identical to Models 1 and 2. As
with Models 1 and 2, the estimates from Models 3 and 4 are also consistent
with the misperceived price model. We ﬁnd that among the healthy, those
with houses are less likely to viaticate than those without, which is consistent
with Predictions 2[M], although in this case the diﬀerence in the viatication
hazards is not statistically signiﬁcant.
7 Alternate Theories
The evidence presented here is consistent with the misperceived price model
rather than the economic model. Here, we consider four alternate explana-
tions that could, under certain conditions, give rise to similar ﬁndings.
One important factor that we did not explicitly model is means-tested
programs such as Medicaid. In most states, proceeds from viatical settle-
ments are counted as assets for the purposes of means-testing, but life insur-
ance polices themselves are excluded. Clearly, this might reduce incentives
to viaticate for individuals who would otherwise be eligible for these pro-
grams. However, the bias here goes the wrong way. Such program rules
make the unhealthy less likely to sell insurance—and contrary to what the
data show—since they tend to be more indigent and thus more likely to be
eligible for Medicaid or other public programs.
A related alternative explanation concerns the tax treatment of viatical
settlements. The 1996 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act,
which came into eﬀect in January 1997, exempts proceeds derived from a
viatical settlement from federal taxes as long as the seller is certiﬁed by a
physician to have a life expectancy of 24 months or less or to be chronically
ill. Several large states, such as California and New York, have also passed
similar provisions exempting viatical settlement transactions from state taxes
[Sutherland and Drivanos, 1999]. Although these laws might lead to a nega-
tive correlation between health and the hazard of selling insurance after 1997,
the vast majority of our data refer to the period before the HIPAA imple-
mentation. Most respondents in our study reported that they sold their life
20insurance before the ﬁrst quarter of 1997 – thus there is only a 2-3 month
overlap in the time when these laws were eﬀective and the period of life
insurance sales in the HCSUS sample.
As in any insurance market, asymmetric information (patients know more
than ﬁrms about their mortality risks) could be an important determinant
of market outcomes in the viatical settlements market. As Akerlof [1970],
Wilson [1977], and Rothschild and Stiglitz [1976] demonstrate, asymmetric
information might lead to adverse selection in insurance markets; that is,
high-risk individuals are more likely to participate and low risks are driven
out of the market. Since, consumers are sellers in this market, adverse selec-
tion in these markets leads to the opposite of the typical “lemons” problems—
patients with unobserved mortality risks rather than the healthier patients
are driven out of the market. However, the institutional details of this in-
dustry argue against the importance of adverse selection in these markets.
In particular, there are good reasons to believe that viatical settlement com-
panies have accurate information on patient’s mortality risks. Unlike other
insurance markets, viatical settlement ﬁrms often use the services of indepen-
dent physicians and actuaries to determine the life expectancy of the seller
National Viatical Association [1999]. Furthermore, companies scrutinize pa-
tient medical records before making an oﬀer to buy, and they have access to
the mortality experience of a large pool of patients.9
Finally, it is worth considering the role of transaction costs. Transaction
costs in credit markets might be systematically diﬀerent for healthy and un-
healthy consumers; in particular, unhealthy consumers might face a higher
cost of borrowing against their house as compared with healthy consumers.
For example, lenders might charge higher prices to unhealthy consumers if
they expect to incur signiﬁcant costs in collecting loan repayments from the
estates of unhealthy consumers and but do not expect such costs for healthy
consumers (as they might be more likely to repay their loans before they die).
In this case, it would be likely that unhealthy consumers would prefer the
viatical settlement market, while healthy consumers would prefer the credit
market to ﬁnance their consumption needs. However, this explanation is
based on two assertions that are unlikely to be true. First, this explanation
assumes that lenders know the health status or life expectancy of borrowers.
This is unlikely since credit applications do not usually require borrowers to
disclose their health status. Second, this explanation assumes that transac-
tion costs in the viatical settlement market do not systematically depend on
the life expectancy of the sellers. However, it seems likely that unhealthy
21consumers, who have little time left alive, might view the sometimes lengthy
process of searching and negotiating with viatical ﬁrms in this relatively new
market as particularly onerous, relative to healthier consumers. Therefore, it
seems unlikely that our results are driven by diﬀerences in transaction costs
in credit markets for healthy and unhealthy consumers, although we cannot
rule out this explanation.
8 Discussion and Conclusions
Our empirical ﬁndings are that, among healthier chronically ill consumers,
homeowners are less likely to sell their life insurance than are non-home own-
ers. In contrast, among unhealthy consumers, homeowners are more likely
to sell their life insurance policies. These empirical ﬁndings cannot be rec-
onciled with a straightforward economic model of savings, consumption, and
bequests. Instead, these ﬁndings are consistent with two possible and mutu-
ally consistent interpretations motivated by the psychology and behavioral
economics literature: (1) relatively unhealthy consumers overestimate their
life expectancy and this “optimism bias” leads them to view actuarially fair
viatical settlement oﬀers more favorably than they would appear to some-
one correctly perceiving mortality risk, and (2) consumers mistakenly believe
that the discount to face value on the viatical settlement is a good approx-
imation to the true price of the viatical settlement. Since in a competitive
market the discount to face value rises with life expectancy, this mistaken
view leads long-life-expectancy consumers to view actuarially fair viatical
settlement oﬀers less favorably than do their unhealthier peers.
This conclusion raises the following question: can such consumer mis-
takes persist in the long run? The standard argument against persistence
of consumer mistakes is that they lead to mispriced or imperfect markets
that in turn create arbitrage opportunities. However, Barberis and Thaler
[2002], in their review of the literature on consumer mistakes in ﬁnancial
markets, argue persuasively that while the statement “prices are right” im-
plies “no free lunch,” the converse does not necessarily hold. They argue that
mispricing does not always lead to arbitrage opportunities, as strategies de-
signed to take advantage of mispricing—especially in ﬁnancial markets—can
be costly or risky. Our results add a new dimension to this debate; we ﬁnd
that “prices are right” does not imply “no mistakes.” Our results show that
despite consumer mistakes, there is no real mispricing in this market—the
22only mistakes are in consumer perceptions not in market prices. Thus, since
prices are actuarially fair (ﬁrms make zero proﬁts), such mistakes are likely
to persist.
The above discussion leads naturally to the policy implication that con-
sumer mistakes might be reduced if buyers in these markets are required to
“decode” prices for sellers in a way that is more easily understandable. Such
regulations have recently been implemented in other mortality contingent
claims markets such as the reverse mortgage market. Reverse mortgage mar-
kets allow consumers to take loans against equity in their homes. However,
unlike normal loans, reverse mortgages limit the loan repayment to the value
of the house and require no repayment for as long as the borrower is alive.
Thus, just like viatical settlement markets, the loan amount available from
a reverse mortgage will depend on the life expectancy of the borrower. Also
like viatical settlement markets, the ex post cost of obtaining funds from a
reverse mortgage will depend on the timing of the borrower’s death—if con-
sumers live well past their life expectancy then a reverse mortgage will have
low costs but if consumers die sooner than expected then a reverse mort-
gage will be expensive. Recognizing that consumers typically ﬁnd it diﬃcult
to compare the costs of a reverse mortgage with other credit instruments,
the Home Owner Equity Protection Act [HOEPA, 1994] subjects all reverse
mortgages to a Truth-in-Lending disclosure. This provision requires lenders
to project and disclose the total annual average cost of these loans if they were
repayed after two years, at the borrower’s life expectancy and 40% beyond
the borrower’s life expectancy. Our ﬁndings suggest that similar regulations
might be beneﬁcial for consumers in secondary life insurance markets.
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A Comparative statics for the economic model
The ﬁrst order conditions from expected utility maximization are:
U
 (C1)=β (1 + r)[(π)V
 (BD)+( 1− π)V
 (BS)] (A-1)
U
 (C2)=V
 (BS)( A - 2 )
V
 (BD)=V
 (BS)( A - 3 )
Rearranging terms and simplifying yields:
U
 (C1)=β (1 + r)V
 (BD)( A - 4 )
U
 (C2)=V
 (BD)( A - 5 )
C2 = L2 −
 
¯ F − F
   r
1+r
 
as [V
 (BD)=V
 (BS) ⇒ BD = BS]( A - 6 )
A.1 Comparative statics with respect to π
Totally diﬀerentiating (A-4), (A-5) and (A-6) and setting changes in all ex-
ogenous parameters except mortality risks equal to zero implies:
 
U
 (C1)+( 1+r)
2 βV
 (BD)
 
dC1 +[ r (1 − π)βV
 (BD)]dF =( A - 7 )
[rFβV
 (BD)]dπ
[(1 + r)V
 (BD)]dC1 +( A - 8 )
   r
1+r
 
U
 (C2)+
  r
1+r
 
(1 − π)V
 (BD)
 
dF =
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1+r
 
FV
 (BD)
 
dπ
24Let D be deﬁned as follows:
D = U (C1)U (C2)
 
r
1+r
 
+
U (C1)V  (BD)(1− π)
 
r
1+r
 
+
V  (BD)U (C2)βr(1 + r)
Under standard assumptions about the utility functions, D is positive.
Solving (A-7) and (A-8) with respect to the endogenous variables yields:
dF
dπ
=
U (C1)V  (BD)F
 
r
1+r
 
D
> 0( A - 9 )
dC1
dπ
=
U (C2)V  (BD)Fβ
 
r2
1+r
 
D
> 0 (A-10)
A.2 Comparative statics with respect to NL
Totally diﬀerentiating (A-4), (A-5) and (A-6) and setting changes in all ex-
ogenous parameters except NL equal to zero implies:
 
U
 (C1)+( 1+r)
2 βV
 (BD)
 
dC1 + (A-11)
[r(1 − π)βV
 (BD)]dF =
[(1 + r)βV
 (BD)]dNL
[(1 + r)V
 (BD)]dC1 + (A-12)
   r
1+r
 
U
 (C2)+
  r
1+r
 
(1 − π)V
 (BD)
 
dF =
   r
1+r
 
U
 (C2)+V
 (BD)
 
dNL
Let A be deﬁned as follows:
A = U
 (C1)
 
V
 (BD)+U
 (C2)
  r
1+r
  
+
V
 (BD)U
 (C2)βr(1 + r)
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dF
dNL
=
A
D
> 0 (A-13)
dC1
dNL
=
V  (BD)U (C2)β
 
r
1+r
 
(1 + πr)
D
> 0 (A-14)
A.3 Comparative statics with respect to L1
Totally diﬀerentiating (A-4), (A-5) and (A-6) and setting changes in all ex-
ogenous parameters except L1 equal to zero implies:
 
U
 (C1)+( 1+r)
2 βV
 (BD)
 
dC1 + (A-15)
[r(1 − π)βV
 (BD)]dF =
 
(1 + r)
2 βV
 (BD)
 
dL1
[(1 + r)V
 (BD)]dC1 + (A-16)
   r
1+r
 
U
 (C2)+
  r
1+r
 
(1 − π)V
 (BD)
 
dF = (A-17)
[(1 + r)V
 (BD)]dL1 (A-18)
Solving (A-15) and (A-16) with respect to the endogenous variables yields:
dF
dL1
=
U (C1)V  (BD)(1+r)
D
> 0 (A-19)
dC1
dL1
=
U (C2)V  (BD)βr(1 + r)
D
> 0 (A-20)
A.4 Comparative statics with respect to L2
Totally diﬀerentiating (A-4), (A-5) and (A-6) and setting changes in all ex-
ogenous parameters except L2 equal to zero implies:
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U
 (C1)+( 1+r)
2 βV
 (BD)
 
dC1 + (A-21)
[r(1 − π)βV
 (BD)]dF =
[0]dL2
[(1 + r)V
 (BD)]dC1 + (A-22)
   r
1+r
 
U
 (C2)+
  r
1+r
 
(1 − π)V
 (BD)
 
dF =
[−U
 (C2)]dL2
Solving (A-21) and (A-22) with respect to the endogenous variables yields:
dF
dL2
= −
U (C1)U (C2)+( 1+r)
2 βV  (BD)U (C2)
D
< 0 (A-23)
dC1
dL2
=
U (C2)V  (BD)βr(1 − π)
D
> 0 (A-24)
27B Monte Carlo computation of hazard ratios
We use Monte Carlo simulations to calculate the hazard ratios and conﬁdence
intervals reported in Table 4. Let µest =
 
βest
λ0
est
 
be the maximum likelihood
estimates of β =( β1,β 2,........βk)( w h e r ek is the number of covariates) and
λ0 =( λ0
1,λ 0
2,...λ 0
9) from equation (17), and let
 
est be the estimated vari-
ance covariance matrix of µ, which is asymptotically distributed multivariate
normal.
In each iteration of the Monte Carlo simulation, we draw a random vec-
tor of regression coeﬃcients, µ(i) =
 
β(i),λ 0(i)
 
from N (µest,Σest), where i
indexes over the iterations. Using this randomly drawn µ(i) we calculate an
average hazard ratio for each dichotomous covariate:
hazard ratioi,k =
1
N
N  
j=1
λj
 
1|Xk =1 ,X k+1 =0 ,...Xk+m =0 ,µ= µ(i)
 
λj (1|Xk =0 ,X k+1 =0 ,...Xk+m =0 ,µ= µ(i))
(B-1)
where, j subscripts over the N respondents in the data set, and (Xk,...Xk+m)
is a mutually exclusive set of dichotomous covariates.
For continuously measured covariates we calculate the average hazard
ratio using:
hazard ratioi,k =
1
N
N  
j=1
λj
 
1|Xk = Xk + θ,µ = µ(i)
 
λj (1|Xk = Xk,µ= µ(i))
(B-2)
where, θ is an arbitrary oﬀset. For the hazard ratio corresponding to age, we
set θ =5y e a r s .
We repeat 100,000 iterations. Finally, we calculate the mean and con-
ﬁdence intervals of (B-1)-(B-2) over all the iterations, which we report in
Table 4.
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29Notes
1 In particular, our test distinguishes sophisticated consumers from or-
dinary ones; it does not pinpoint whether mistakes by ordinary consumers,
if they occur, are due to misperceived mortality risk or misassessed price
signals.
2 In Bhattacharya et al. [2002], we develop evidence that secondary life
insurance markets are competitively priced. In particular, we ﬁnd that cal-
culations of the expected net present value of viatical settlements for peo-
ple with diﬀerent life expectancies match (suitably transformed) transaction
prices in that market.
3 The secondary life insurance industry emerged in the 1980s in response
to the advent of AIDS, which at that time was almost always fatal. The
industry has grown rapidly, with $500 million in policies sold by 1995 and
$1 billion in policies by 1998 [National Viatical Association, 1999]. The dis-
covery of eﬀective medication for HIV infection appears not to have deterred
growth. Companies are expanding their business and some have started mar-
keting viatical settlements to the elderly and patients with other terminal
illnesses [American Council of Life Insurance, 1999].
4 We also abstract away from consumers who are not ‘cash-constrained’—
that is, those who save liquid assets to ﬁnance future consumption or bequests—
because such individuals would never be interested in viaticating.
5 For H1 consumers with an initial optimum in the lower part of the
budget constraint, an increase in NL will have no eﬀect on the supply of life
insurance.
6 Including the 344 respondents who had at least one missing value has
no appreciable eﬀect on the summary statistics that we report in Table 1.
7 This relationship between non-liquid assets and house ownership persist
even after controlling for health status. For both healthy and unhealthy
consumers house ownership is associated with signiﬁcantly higher non-liquid
assets.
8The graph is plotted for patients in the reference income category—
1(Income<$500).
309 Of course, even these eﬀorts may not completely eliminate asymmetric
information—patients may still have private information about their health
status and the eﬀorts they will undertake to avoid poor health.
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34Table 1: Weighted Descriptive Statistics at Baseline
Variables  
Never sold 
life insurance  
(N=740)  
Ever 
sold life 
insurance  
(N=146)  
Entire 
sample  
(N = 886)   
CD4 T-cell levels:        
        < 50 cells per ml   9.36%   12.08%   9.83%  
        50 – 200 cells per ml   21.68%   40.00%   24.84%  
        201 – 500 cells per ml   43.32%   31.40%   41.26%  
        > 500 cells per ml   25.64%   16.52%   24.07%  
Disease Stage:       
        Asymptomatic   10.93%   11.85%   11.09%  
        Symptomatic   54.37%   38.61%   51.64%  
        AIDS  34.70%   49.54%   37.26%  
Income and Assets:       
House ownership    29.38%   33.57%   30.11%  
Monthly Income        
         < $500   15.81%   13.57%   15.42%  
         $501 - $2000   39.85%   38.73%   39.66%  
         > $2000   44.34%   47.70%   44.92%  
Bequest Motives:       
Any Children Alive   37.82%   29.18%   36.32%  
Married 16.01%   12.30%   15.37%  
Separated, Divorced, Widowed   25.55%  28.06%  25.98%  
Never Married 
 
58.44%
 
59.64%
 
58.64%
  Demographics:
 
  
  Age   34.88  years
 
38.01 years
 
35.42 years
  Male 84.19%
 
89.35%
 
85.08%
  Black 25.41%
 
17.32%
 
24.01%
  Hispanic
 
13.61%
 
4.18%
 
11.98%
  White 56.68%
 
75.97%
 
60.01%
  Other race
 
4.30%
 
2.53%
 
3.99%
  Have college degree 24.52%
 
36.38%
 
26.57%
 
 
35Table 2: One-Year Mortality Probit Regression
Variable Coefficient  Standard  Error 
CD4 T-cell < 50  1.40  0.39 
CD4 T-cell 51-200  0.50  0.39 
CD4 T-cell 201-500  0.32  0.38 
CD4 T-cell 500+
* -   
Asymptomatic -0.51  0.47 
Symptomatic -0.41  0.22 
AIDS
* -   
Intercept -2.25  0.38 
*  Reference categories  
36Table 3: Hypotheses
Prediction Test
† 
Misperceived price Model  
Prediction 1: Negative correlation 
between health status and the 
decision to viaticate.  
￿￿ ￿ ￿ |Unhealthy, House |Healthy, House t  t ￿  
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ | Unhealthy, No House |Healthy, No House t        t ￿
 
Prediction 2a: Among healthy 
consumers, negative correlation 
between the decision to viaticate 
and the amount of nonliquid 
assets 
 
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ | Healthy, House |Healthy, No House tt ￿￿ ￿  
Prediction 2b: Among unhealthy 
consumers, a positive correlation 
between the decision to viaticate 
and the amount of nonliquid 
assets 
 
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ |Unhealthy, House |Unhealthy, No House t t ￿  
Prediction 3: Zero or negative 
correlation between liquid assets 
and the decision to viaticate  
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
|Income $2,000+ |Income $500 to $2,000
             |Income below $500
tt
t
￿￿
￿
￿
￿
 
  Economic Model 
Prediction 1: Negative correlation 
between health status and the 
decision to viaticate.  
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ |Unhealthy, House |Healthy, House t    t ￿     
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ | Unhealthy, No House |Healthy, No House t        t ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿  
Prediction 2a: Among healthy 
consumers, positive correlation 
between the decision to viaticate 
and the amount of nonliquid 
assets 
 
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ | Healthy, House |Healthy, No House tt ￿￿ ￿  
 
Prediction 2b: Among unhealthy 
consumers, a positive correlation 
between the decision to viaticate 
and the amount of nonliquid 
assets 
 
￿￿ ￿ ￿ |Unhealthy, House |Unhealthy, No House t  t ￿￿ ￿ ￿  
Prediction 3: Positive correlation 
between liquid assets and the 
decision to viaticate  
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
|Income $2,000+ |Income $500 to $2,000
            > |Income below $500
tt
t
￿￿
￿
￿
 
†  ￿￿ t ￿  is the hazard of viaticating at time t. 
￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿
￿￿ ￿
37Table 4: Empirical models of viatication hazards
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
 
Variables 
Haz.  Ratio 
 (Conf Int.) 
Haz.  Ratio 
(Conf Int.) 
Haz.  Ratio 
(Conf Int.) 
Haz.  Ratio 
(Conf Int.) 
Income       
  Income < $500  1.00 
(Ref Cat) 
1.00 
(Ref Cat) 
1.00 
(Ref Cat) 
1.00 
(Ref Cat) 
  Income $500 –2000  1.08 
(0.69 – 1.64) 
0.90 
(0.55 – 1.43) 
1.05 
(0.69 – 1.56) 
0.88 
(0.54 – 1.38) 
  Income > $2000  1.42 
(0.91 – 2.14) 
1.02 
(0.60 – 1.64) 
1.35 
(0.88 – 2.00) 
0.98 
(0.58 – 1.55) 
House ownership and Health Status       
  Healthy*House  1.00 
(Ref Cat) 
1.00 
(Ref Cat) 
1.00 
(Ref Cat) 
1.00 
(Ref Cat) 
  Unhealthy*House  3.90 
(2.37 – 6.24) 
4.35 
(2.50 – 7.13) 
2.71 
(1.62 – 4.39) 
2.93 
(1.64 – 4.90) 
  Unhealthy *NoHouse   2.16 
(1.31 – 3.41) 
2.46 
(1.39 – 4.03) 
2.25 
(1.35 – 3.60) 
2.60 
(1.45 – 4.35) 
  Healthy*NoHouse   1.55 
(1.00 – 2.36) 
1.83 
(1.11 – 2.84) 
1.31 
(0.77 – 2.12) 
1.56 
(0.87 – 2.61) 
Bequest Motives       
  Never Married  -  1.00 
(Ref Cat) 
- 1.00 
(Ref Cat) 
  Married   -  1.12 
(0.63 – 1.83) 
- 1.07 
(0.62 – 1.70) 
  Separated, Widowed, Divorced  -  1.02 
(0.71 – 1.42) 
- 1.09 
(0.76 – 1.50) 
  At Least One Child Alive  -  0.73 
(0.47 – 1.08) 
- 0.73 
(0.48 – 1.07) 
  Living Alone  -  1.02 
(0.75 – 1.37) 
- 1.01 
(0.75 – 1.34) 
Demographics       
  White  -  1.00 
(Ref Cat) 
- 1.00 
(Ref Cat) 
  Black#  -  0.67 
(0.44 – 0.98) 
- 0.73 
(0.48 – 1.04) 
  Hispanic#  -  0.32 
(0.13 – 0.62) 
- 0.33 
(0.13 – 0.66) 
  Other Race#  -  0.55 
(0.20 – 1.17) 
- 0.60 
(0.21 – 1.25) 
  Age  -  1.21 
(1.10 – 1.34) 
- 1.21 
(1.10 – 1.33) 
  Male  -  1.03 
(0.61 – 1.70) 
- 1.08 
(0.65 – 1.77) 
Education       
  Less Than High School  -  1.00 
(Ref Cat) 
- 1.00 
(Ref Cat) 
  High Schoolº  -  0.65 
(0.33 – 1.20) 
- 0.66 
(0.34 – 1.21) 
  Some Collegeº  -  1.54 
(0.84 – 2.66) 
- 1.64 
(0.91 – 2.80) 
  College º  -  1.24 
(0.61 – 2.31) 
- 1.30 
(0.64 – 2.41) 
 
38Figure 1: Timeline for Two-Period Model
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39Figure 2: Budget Constraint for H3 Consumers
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40Figure 3: The Eﬀect of Increasing Non-Liquid Assets for H1 Consumers
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41Figure 4: The Eﬀect of Increasing Non-Liquid Assets for H3 Consumers
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42Figure 5: Proportion Not Viaticated by Health Status and House Ownership
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